Climate Now Episode 152
March 26, 2024
How climate changes where people live
In this Episode
In the U.S. alone, 162 million people will experience a worse quality of life due to the changing climate within the next 30 years. Rising sea levels stand to displace 13 million Americans in the long run while wildfires and other risks are likely to displace millions more. With 3.2 million American climate migrants to-date, it’s time to start thinking about what our country’s future might look like.
Even these statistics may be vast underestimates because nailing down someone’s exact reason for moving is harder than it may seem. So, how do we determine what factors influence people’s decisions to move? Why is climate migration about more than beating the heat? What history brought us here and where are we headed? This week’s episode with investigative journalist and author Abrahm Lustgarten will answer these questions and more.
Episode Transcript
James Lawler: [00:00:00] Welcome to Climate Now. I’m your host, James Lawler, and today we’re speaking with a guest who spent years exploring how climate change is driving tens of millions of people away from the places they call home.
First, some background about why we’re covering this topic. The World Bank estimates that by 2050, 216 million people will be displaced as climate change intensifies. The United Nations Refugee Agency found that the majority of displacements fueled by climate change related events are internal, that is, people moving within their home countries. And the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reported that 675,000 United States citizens were forced to relocate internally in the year 2022 due to climate impacts.
Here to guide us through the political and environmental forces that are shaping why and where people are moving within the United States is Abrahm Lustgarten, an investigative reporter with ProPublica. Abrahm has been [00:01:00] reporting on climate change adaptation trends for 15 years, and his book, On the Move, The Overheating Earth and the Uprooting of America, was released on March 26th.
Before writing his book, Abrahm published a three part investigative series of articles with the New York Times Magazine in 2020 about global climate driven migrations. That series analyzed public and private data to create maps that reveal how a warming world will change where people live and grow food using wildfire projection models from the United States Forest Service and data collected by the Rhodium Group, which has been featured on this podcast before. The investigation found that extreme heat and humidity are likely to have significantly impacted the south and southwestern parts of the United States by 2040. Here’s that conversation.
Welcome Abrahm. It’s great to have you.
Abrahm Lustgarten: Great to be here. Thank you.
James Lawler: So let’s talk about your book On the Move. This is on a topic that we’ve heard a lot about over the last year, there were a number of stories that came out, one of which I believe was yours on the future of climate [00:02:00] migration in the United States and elsewhere. Give us a high level of what your research has been about and what this book is.
Abrahm Lustgarten: Yeah, thank you. You know, uh, it was 2017 or so I started brainstorming with my editors at ProPublica and the New York Times Magazine about, you know, what’s the greatest human impact of climate change and the prospect of large scale migration was one significant answer to that. And that was sort of the starting point for a project that was then that three-part series in the New York Times Magazine, which was a global examination of you know, how populations and people will begin to move in response to climate change, and that’s what the book On the Move focuses on which is really the question of how is climate change changing the way Americans live, how is it changing, you know, the location of communities and the feasibility of communities across America, and what are we collectively going to do in response to that? And one answer is going to be [00:03:00] you know that we’re going to move, but in general, we’re going to change how we live in a lot of ways.
James Lawler: So we’ve had a few conversations with folks in, you know, some of the harder hit regions of the country like Phoenix, Arizona, for example, that experienced such a, you know, horrific heat in the summer of 2023. And there are all kinds of narratives that keep people moving to Phoenix and places like it around, you know, jobs and around low cost of living and sort of opportunity, the lack of of terrible winters, et cetera. At what point does the power of those narratives lose out to just the sweltering heat in a place like Phoenix, and how could we predict that tipping point?
Abrahm Lustgarten: Yeah, I think you’re right. I mean, you know, we’re, we’re the frogs in the, in the slowly heating pot, right? And, and so the personal individual decisions that we each make about when to change our lives in response to the changing environment around [00:04:00] us is unbelievably complex.
You know, climate driven migration, for example, is never going to be a singular thing. It’s going to be, you know, some kind of influence in a swirling pot of economic incentives and family ties or, you know, violence or crime or things like that. So all these things are going to swirl together for people in Arizona, trying to figure out, you know, where to spend the rest of their lives. And I don’t pretend that it’s possible to identify exactly when that tipping point will be or, or how many people will leave Phoenix, for example, so much as identify what the drivers are that will push us towards that tipping point and talk about the inevitability of it arriving.
One of the premises of my book is that it’s not just the growing discomfort or the trauma of living with our physical environments. But that the economic circumstances around how we live in those environments are changing too. And so that means that people’s decisions will be [00:05:00] driven, for example, by the rising cost of air conditioning, to the extent that that’s a factor or the way that their employment opportunities change. And that might be because an industry leaves Phoenix as, as an example, or it might be because an industry is growing very quickly in a different place that has a different kind of risk portfolio, but there’s a bunch of sort of swirling factors here, including the way that we have as a country from a policy standpoint subsidized, you know where people live and, you know, Arizona is a great example of that, because it seems like it’s just economic opportunity and, you know, and sunny skies that draws people to, to Arizona and places like it, surely those are significant, but it’s also the way that, you know, the federal government has paid for all of the water infrastructure that makes water virtually free in Phoenix.
Or the way that in other high-risk parts of the country that I’m looking at along the Gulf Coast, for example, that states subsidize the cost of insurance, you know, that really erased the, the risk for [00:06:00] owning a home and so those kinds of incentives are starting to change. The cost of water, the availability of water is changing, the cost of insurance in places like Florida or Louisiana is going up and that’s an economic pressure that I really think is going to increasingly influence people’s decision making about where they live.
James Lawler: As you have done this research and thought about all of these factors that lead people to live where they live and may stop doing so, what do you think the largest vectors will be for climate migration in the United States, and when do you think we’ll likely start to see these take shape?
I know I’m asking you to do something that you just said a second ago is very hard to do, but you must have thought about it, and, uh, I know that some of this is in the book, so what are your thoughts on that?
Abrahm Lustgarten: Yeah so macro picture is I expect that Americans will begin to move northward and particularly towards the northeast and that that will happen sooner than we think that it’s begun [00:07:00] now.
And I explore a lot of examples of where that movement has begun, but it’s really going to you know, pick up over the next two decades and a lot of the data that I use to inform my book, you know, looks at a 2040 to 2060 timeframe, which is really right around the corner. I worked closely with the Rhodium Group, uh, to look at several key factors. There’s a lot of obvious, uh, you know, climate influences on the United States um but we tried to break those down into looking at wildfire risk, uh, extreme heat, coastal flooding, um, changes in crop yields, changes in economic impacts and damages from climate change. And when you map all of those, it basically shows a country with the walls closing in around it, squeezing from the side, squeezing from the west and squeezing from the south and that’s how you get that kind of northward trajectory.
James Lawler: And you have this wonderful phrase “goblins of risk” to describe these, these factors that are closing in, right?
Abrahm Lustgarten: Yeah, that’s kind of how I felt when I was reading it. And looking at the, I’m a very visual person, so, you know, so we started with [00:08:00] the data and it’s in spreadsheets and we mapped it and personally, as I started to, to look at those indicators, I felt like I was sort of being chased and I arrived at the, at that phrasing.
You know, and that’s kind of how I felt living in California and being smothered by smoke and worrying about wildfire in my own community and thinking about, was it time for me to move my family, and if so, where would I go? And then I’d pick a couple of places on the map that I’d always thought about living and I’d realized that they weren’t the safe spots. You know, I’d always thought about moving to Boulder, Colorado, and you look at those maps and you see extraordinary water scarcity and extreme fire risk as well. And so I had the, I had, you know, just this sense of you know, climate change as a big monster, sort of going to chase us around a little bit.
James Lawler: Mm hmm. So tell us some examples of where we’re already seeing this migration begin today.
Abrahm Lustgarten: One of the bits of research I look at is around where people went after the fires in Paradise, California in 2018, and this was an extraordinary [00:09:00] fire.
A small town in Northern California that burst into flames over the space of a couple of hours, 85 people died, and most of the community of around 35, 000 people left. And what the researchers found is that that diaspora spread across all 50 states, that there are paradise residents living across the country in just about every place and that they cluster closer to home, that there are still lots of people living in California, but many people have already begun to move out.
Uh, similarly, there, there’s a lot of people leaving the Gulf Coast, which is one of the most high risk, you know, parts of the country affected severely by both sea level rise and in Louisiana in particular by subsidence. And you know, one example is this community called Isle de Jean Charles in Southern Louisiana, which is, you know, a small Native American community that has been physically relocated at this point, but has been grappling with the effects of sea level rise there over the last couple of decades is probably the most explicit [00:10:00] example of retreat and relocation in the United States.
James Lawler: Hmm an interesting question is what the relationship will likely be between the degree of warming that the planet experiences and the level of relocation that we’re likely to observe Abraham’s research does get into this, but it’s important to provide a little bit of background to understand the connections that he makes.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or the IPCC, published official climate models with varying emissions scenarios beginning in the year 1992. The IPCC continually updates their models and in 2014 a new set of projections using what are called integrated assessment models came online. These models focused on emissions projections to simulate future climate scenarios and named each potential trajectory a representative concentration pathway, or RCP for short.
So these RCPs encompass four increasingly severe warming scenarios [00:11:00] based on future greenhouse gas concentration levels with the lowest greenhouse gas concentration scenario referred to as RCP 2.6 followed by RCP 4.5, RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5. RCP 8. 5 represents the worst case scenario, and has become synonymous with a term that you might have heard, business as usual, in the public media and policy reports. That was eventually criticized for being too extreme and even unlikely.
A few years later, more comprehensive climate pathways focused on incorporating technological development, economic growth, and demographic information. These new standards are called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, or SSPs, and they include five different scenarios that were published in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report in 2021.
The SSPs are kind of like narratives of a future world. For example, one SSP assumes countries all work [00:12:00] together. Another SSP assumes they all act independently without working together at all. In that scenario, as you might expect, things don’t turn out very well. So while the two ways of thinking about the future, the RCPs and the SSPs, are different, they are both valuable and they complement each other.
So joint analyses from the narrative focused SSP models and greenhouse gas focused RCP scenarios can help answer questions about future migration strategies or policy priorities across the spectrum of best or worst case climate scenarios. So with that background, let’s get back to the interview.
Abraham, when you consider climate models in your book, what scenarios are you thinking about most when considering future climate driven migration of the scale that we’ve been discussing?
Abrahm Lustgarten: So the book explores and explains the difference between, you know, extreme scenarios and what an RCP, you know, RCP 8.5 means. I tried to pull them back to an RCP 4.5[00:13:00] scenario, which I think is really close to where we’re headed.
James Lawler: And for our listeners, an RCP 4. 5 scenario is described by the IPCC as an intermediate scenario. In that scenario, by the year 2040 emissions peak, global average temperature rise is about 3 degrees Celsius by 2100, which is equivalent to about 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit, with many, if not most, plant and animal species unable to adapt and unable to survive under that scenario. So not a pretty picture.
Abrahm Lustgarten: And that is roughly on track with how we have emitted our carbon up to this point and what likely achievements we’re going to make over the next couple of decades, given the policies that are in place and the political momentum building for some action.
So it kind of reflects the way that we’ve done very little up till now, but we are making some progress. It is not a worst case scenario, it is a middle ground that we could well exceed.
James Lawler: What do you believe will happen [00:14:00] under that warming scenario?
Abrahm Lustgarten: So the same signals that that drive the conclusions of my research, this growing in-hospitability of the west and the southern parts of the country and the coastal parts of the country and the general trajectory of people northward doesn’t change whether we talk about RCP 4.5 or even something very conservative like a, like an RCP 2.0 that we’ve already surpassed. We end up talking about the difference between, you know, crop failures in Texas that might be in the 50 to 60 percent range with an RCP 4.5 versus a 90 percent range, you know, with an RCP 8.5 and similar impacts for projected economic damages in these parts of the country. So it really becomes a matter of sort of gradation of impact, but the impacts will be severe and noticeable and significant for Americans, even under the most conservative and limited climate impact scenario.
James Lawler: So you mentioned agriculture and the [00:15:00] effects of warming on American agriculture. This is something that Rhodium Group we know has spent a lot of time thinking about. What were your findings based on, you know, sort of a, you know, warming scenario of RCP 4.5 or thereabouts?
Abrahm Lustgarten: One of the things we know about agriculture and I’m, and I’m largely focused on agriculture in the high plains, which drives, you know, a 35 billion annual industry for exports and food production in the United States. And one of the things we know is that that crop yields in that part of the country have already declined by about 12 percent due to the warming that’s already occurred. And some of the research outside of rhodium group, including from Columbia University projects that those crop yields will be more impacted by temperature increase and that will be by a decrease in water availability. And so, regardless of whether we find enough water supplies to continue to support that agriculture, the warming that is, uh, already happening and is slated to happen is [00:16:00] projected to reduce crop yields to something around, um, what was experienced during the dust bowl. So a really dramatic, significant impact to our ability to grow food in that part of the country.
James Lawler: What’s the time horizon on that?
Abrahm Lustgarten: So that research looks at late century. So 2070, 2090 for dust bowl era yields, and the Rhodium Group analysis is in line with, with those sorts of projections and it looks at, you know, key indicator crops at the big industrial crops, the soy and corn, for example, as proxies for, for our general ability to grow food.
And the Rhodium data basically suggests that by middle of the century, we can see crop declines in the heartland of the country by around 30 to 40 percent and in large parts of the southern half of Texas by 60 to 90 percent and some of those, you know, coastal counties, the furthest south really by 100 percent predicting a total inability to grow large industrial crops.
James Lawler: When you think [00:17:00] about the total number of people that are likely to be displaced, what is your sort of best guess of how many people are likely going to move and how quickly will all of this happen?
Abrahm Lustgarten: That’s an incredibly difficult question to answer. I’d put the number at somewhere between 13 and 100 million, you know, so we have a very wide range. It’s easier to estimate the number of people who will be negatively impacted in their environments. And the data that I used in my reporting suggests that that number is around 160 million Americans or about half of the American population.
At the other end of estimates, it’s easy to estimate how many people will be displaced by projected sea level rise because It’s a lot easier to decide to move when your house is underwater than it is to decide to move when your summers are getting too hot, and that number is around 13 million Americans currently living in places where tide [00:18:00] lines will be above where they live now by, by mid century, by 2060 or so.
Even at the smallest end of the scale, we’re talking about twice as many people moving within this space of a couple of decades as the largest migration in American history, and it could well be 5 to 10 times that size.
James Lawler: Wow. So if you’re a policymaker reading your book today, how should the United States start preparing for this future?
Abrahm Lustgarten: I think this is a different answer depending on where in the United States were focused on, and so to take it at the regional level, you know, parts of the country need to focus on degrowth and parts of the country need to focus on on growth essentially.
And so if you are in a region or governing a region that’s expected to see an influx of new residents, then you need to prepare that community for receiving a large number of people for taking advantage of, of having that larger population economically. Housing them, transporting them, having food supplies [00:19:00] and if you’re in a southern part of the country that might see out migration, you know, those cities and communities need to think about how you can shrink your community so that it remains vibrant and full, maybe at a smaller size so that you can have a tax base that’s proportional to the services that you continue to provide.
I don’t think we’re going to see a future where parts of the country are abandoned or whole cities are evacuated. It’s a subtler change, but you will see communities that shrink and if those places are not careful, that shrinkage can lead to kind of a spiral of economic decline, we lose a tax base that fails to support a school system that drives more families away and you end up with, you know, empty housing stock and empty streets and no revenue stream to do anything. So you want to plan to contract and keep your community proportional to the resources that it has to work with, and that’s a real mental change for a lot of places.
I think it [00:20:00] goes against the grain of, you know, of American culture. And from a federal perspective, I think that you need to have policies that can recognize the differences regionally between what’s happening and support those changes, support growth in destination areas with robust investment. Support degrowth in, you know, in outpouring areas, which also might require some investment. I think that there needs to be growing sensitivity to the scale of, of change and a willingness, you know, to invest in those changes in a way that’s proportional to future forecasts and not necessarily proportional to the way we’ve budgeted in the past.
James Lawler: So a point that you make a number of times in the book is just how sheltered our society in America is from the environment and in a variety of ways. And so we don’t often think of the environment as a factor that really deeply influences our way of life or our business or how we think about our futures.
Of course, we’re aware of it. We’re [00:21:00] aware of warm days and cool days, or we’re aware of where that’s smoky or not smoky, but we don’t really think of it as being a factor in determining our future. But when you actually sort of break it down and think about what happens as you just did, hotter days mean, you know, less agricultural crops mean lower incomes for farmers, slowing industries that supply those farmers with what they need, loss of tax base, declining schools, people move, et cetera. You can sort of start to see how all of this spirals. You point a couple of times in this conversation to the Dust Bowl as a precipitating event that caused extensive migration, and that we could think about that as like analogous to what we might be facing.
Can you talk a little bit about the Dust Bowl and what we might see ss the effects of climate change build?
Abrahm Lustgarten: I mean, the dust bowl was precipitated, uh, first by a bunch of, you know, kind of reckless and aggressive agricultural policies that created a vulnerability in Great [00:22:00] Plains States, the United States.
And then that was quickly followed by an extraordinary drought event, which also happened to come at the same time those communities were trying to recover from from the Great Depression. And so it was the confluence of all of those things. I get like a perfect example of how environmental influence intersects with economic pressures and it, it decimated crop yields and those crop yields not only led to the unemployment of the workers who worked in those fields, but precipitated that very spiral decline we were just talking about, eventually affected the nexus communities, the larger cities in the Great Plains and took business away from restaurants and farm equipment dealerships and so on.
And the net effect was that about two and a half to four million people migrated out of that area. Uh, and many of them came to California to the Central Valley of California, but others went elsewhere. And it, it took decades for the Great Plains part of the country to stabilize and there’s research that shows that those communities hardest hit still [00:23:00] lag economically behind. It’s something like there’s 7 percent less economic activity in the communities hardest hit during the Dust Bowl years and there are comparable communities a couple hundred miles away and their growth rate has been slower as well.
You see that diaspora, you see how it’s permanently changed, you know, the culture of the country, both leading to extraordinary growth in agriculture in California as a result, and extraordinary economic shrinkage and decline that has been lasting almost a century later in the middle part of the country.
James Lawler: You’ve mentioned anecdotally, there’s evidence of people beginning to move as a result of climate. I mean, presumably we should be able to study this and get better data than just anecdotal data about whether people are moving or not as a result of the climate. Are there efforts underway to do this?
Abrahm Lustgarten: It’s harder to measure and it’s harder to track than you might think.
James Lawler: Is it? Okay.
Abrahm Lustgarten: You have to both be able to identify the driving factor, if there is a singular or even just three driving factors, [00:24:00] when a person or family decides to move and you have to be able to record their version of that decision making and both of those things are incredibly difficult from a data standpoint. Some of the best research is from Redfin, the real estate firm, and they’ve conducted a small pool survey around 2000 people, but they have shown a dramatic change in the way Americans are thinking about these questions over the last couple of years from really like a lack of consideration around climate or very subtle influence of climate and they’re in people’s decision making when they move, you know, a couple of years ago to now about two thirds to three quarters, depending on which question, you know, is asked. People saying that they’re considering the effects or the pressures of climate and their decision about whether to sell their home or whether to move.
The question of who exactly is moving from where and to where as a result of climate pressures is incredibly difficult to measure. Even globally, that’s something that researchers [00:25:00] have strained to collect data on past migrations, let alone to project future migrations. And one of the hurdles in researching for this book in the United States that I talk about at length is that Americans demographically don’t really fit the same patterns that make it easier to you know, to measure those climate driven migrations in other parts of the world, in part because subsidies and economic policies here have kind of perverted a lot of, of those logical moves. So all those things combine to say that it’s actually very difficult to, to forecast and to measure present moment climate driven migration.
James Lawler: One of the shocking statistics that you highlight in your book is the percentage of structures that are likely to burn. I guess the majority of private properties face a one in four chance of burning from wildfire over the next 30 years, which is a relevant time period, because that’s the duration of your, your typical mortgage, which is just so shocking to me. Like it’s very hard to [00:26:00] wrap your head around, you know.
Abrahm Lustgarten: Yeah, that that statistic in particular, I think that’s from research that comes from First Street Foundation. But yeah, it’s incredibly striking and what that says to me, you know, is that maybe a lot of people move in response to losing, you know, that one in four chance of losing their home to wildfire but even the people who do not or cannot will be living amidst fire.
That losing our home to fire is something that almost all of us or many of us are likely to experience in our lifetimes and that that’s just one more characteristic of the future world we’re going into, regardless of migration or large scale, you know, population change, we’re going to be accepting new and life threatening risks with, you know, great regularity in the near future.
James Lawler: Yeah.
Abrahm Lustgarten: Some of the people I talked to about how they would live with those kinds of conditions talk about a more nomadic lifestyle, talk about returning to the era of the caveman. And, you know, and these folks don’t know exactly what that might mean to them, but perhaps it means [00:27:00] going someplace safer during wildfire season, taking your family to, you know, to a different part of the country and then coming back, um, maybe having that mobility in your workplace, um, and not having this sort of permanent rooted sense of home.
James Lawler: So you’ve done all this work, you’ve lived through several seasons of wildfire, and you have not moved yet. Are you going to move anytime soon?
Abrahm Lustgarten: I still do not have an answer to that question and I think about it not only every day, but probably every hour. And I’ve come to accept that as being perfectly indicative of the difficulty of this thought process for, for everyone and being emblematic of how difficult it is to think about when would you change your entire life and uproot, you know, your family. When I began working on this book, the answer seems much easier and more accessible to me than it does now. I thought I would have moved by the time I finished the book.
James Lawler: Interesting.
Abrahm Lustgarten: What’s happened in the years between [00:28:00] start and finish is both a lull in the severity of the climate impacts that I’m personally facing, right? We’ve had a couple of years in California of less severe wildfire impacts. And at the same time, I’ve grown a little bit more resilient to the prospect of that environmental change. I study it. I think about it all the time. It doesn’t get better through doing that, but it gets a little less scary. And so that’s another headwind on that process of disrupting your home and stability to move somewhere else. And I really love where I live, and it’s a difficult place to leave, so I take myself as sort of the perfect experiment for everybody else facing similar questions.
James Lawler: I’m lucky to live in upstate New York, which is the place on your map where you’re likely to be best off with all of this stuff although, we’ll see.
Abrahm Lustgarten: Well, so the, the wildfire data that I used in the book happens to say that the frequency of, of wildfire in Syracuse, New York will, will triple [00:29:00] over the next couple of decades. And we see wildfire in relatively unexpected places, you know, Florida, Tennessee, so I think that’s one example of what we keep learning again and again, which is that no place is really immune to climate change and to disasters, whether that’s the flooding in New Hampshire and Vermont or the risk of wildfire in upstate New York. It might just not be as extreme as it is in other parts of the country, but we’re all going to experience significant change in our environments.
James Lawler: Yeah, yeah. So how do you deal with it? Like, how do you get out of bed in the morning? You’re steeped in this research, which paints a picture of an incredibly bleak future and yet you persist. How do you do that mentally?
Abrahm Lustgarten: Yeah, I mean, I I’m asked this question all the time and I and I always struggle to arrive at an answer or an answer that that feels genuine and you know, I don’t entirely know.
I do find, [00:30:00] um, some purpose in engaging directly, uh, you know, in, uh, in the changes and the threats that we’re faced with as a journalist. Um, you know, I’m driven into the subject matter by my curiosity and by understanding that it’s the most important influence and change on civilization in our lifetimes and maybe ever. So I can’t look away from that perspective.
And then personally, it’s a lot to carry and my solutions to that are not always conscious, but I think that they always involve, you know, some degree of compartmentalization of the information or, you know, dissociation from what I’m working on. Sometimes I think about this and I find my own behavior, you know, quite irrational, right?
I can spend all day studying something and then I can just like forget about it and go on with my social life or recreational life, you know, after I leave my computer in a way that doesn’t seem to rationally reflect what I know is happening in the world around me and continuing to live in a place that I think is high risk is a [00:31:00] perfect example of that.
But psychologically, you know, that’s what happens with me on a, on a scale on a daily basis and I think that’s strange and it’s, you know, in some ways unhealthy, but it’s also part of what makes this survivable and doesn’t just wear me down to the extent that I can’t engage meaningfully in the subject matter of the next day or that I can’t think deeply and productively about how we do solve the challenges that we face. I’ve tried to think of this whole process less as, you know, the coming apocalypse and more as just an extraordinary change that I think is going to happen a little faster than we’re accustomed to experiencing change, but that it’s a shift with plenty of, of plenty of bad things happening, there’s really a lot of opportunity.
James Lawler: Well, I think we’ll adjourn there, but thank you again, Abrahm, for joining us. It’s been great to have you.
Abrahm Lustgarten: Thanks, James. Great to have the conversation.
James Lawler: That’s a wrap for this week’s episode of Climate Now. Special thanks to Abrahm for joining us today. If you’d like to dive deeper [00:32:00] into how climate migration will change where and how Americans live, Abrahm’s book On the Move, The Overheating Earth and the Uprooting of America is available now.
We love hearing from our listeners, so please don’t hesitate to get in touch by emailing us at contact@climatenow.com. For a full transcript of this conversation and a list of sources from today’s episode, please go to our website, climatenow.com. We hope you’ll join us for our next conversation.